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This paper examines the views of directors of public listed Australian companies 
regarding the role of the independent director and the significance of that role in 
relationship to the composition of the Board of Company Directors (BOCD). The 
preferred model for board composition in Australian public listed companies is that of 
a majority of Non-Executive Directors. Whilst this model is promoted in Australia 
there is conflicting evidence surrounding the claim that a majority of independent 
members in the board structure contributes to high levels of performance.  
The data reported were collected in qualitative research which examined the 
perceptions of governance practice held by a group of Australian company directors 
holding positions on boards of public listed companies between 1997 and 2000. The 
research is looking at directors’ perceptions of how and why independent directors 
contribute to board performance The analysis indicates that participating directors 
were convinced that a majority of Non-Executive Directors provided a safeguard for a 
balance of power in the board/management relationship. The difference between 
Non-Executive Directors, who are also independent directors, and Non-Executive 
Directors who are not independent, was an important distinction which was 
highlighted.  The capacity for board members to think independently was seen to be 
enhanced, but not necessarily ensured, with majority membership of Non-Executive 
Directors. However, a majority of independent minds expressing multiple points of 




Non-executive directors; independent company directors; board performance; Boards 




The article reports qualitative research which examines the perceptions of 
governance practice held by a group of company directors holding positions on 
boards of Australian public listed companies between 1997 and 2000. This paper 
looks at the views of participating directors regarding the role of the independent 
director and the significance of that role in relationship to the composition of the 
Board of Company Directors (BOCD).  
The paper is organized as follows. The research objectives and methodology are 
briefly outlined. A profile of the directors participating in the research is accompanied 
by a set of descriptions for various types of directors that make up the membership of 
a BOCD.  The remaining sections of the paper are derived from significant categories 
of interview data that provided the views held by participating directors when 
discussing the role of the independent director.  The significance of the independent 
director is examined, followed by a discussion that focuses on the ways in which 
independence is demonstrated on BOCDs. Directors’ responsibilities to shareholders 
and their availability for attending to board duties are also discussed. The final 
section examines the directors’ views on the selection of independent directors.  
Quotes from interviews are used throughout the paper. Discussions are based on the 
views of the participating directors. The convention adopted for acknowledging 
extracts from interviews (…/) is adhered to throughout the paper. 
Research Design 
The research was part of a study of ‘best practice corporate governance’. The 
research involved interviews with directors of Australian public listed companies and 
funds management executives. The following assumptions underpin the study; 
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• there is no single, universal theory of organisational structure to inform 
Corporate Governance models (Charkham 1995); 
•  models of Corporate Governance adapt to context (Van den Berghe & De 
Ridder 1999), and occur within a prevailing legal framework (Wymeersch 
1998);  
• Corporate governance operates in a market based economy (Hilmer 1993). 
Methodology 
This qualitative study is situated within the constructivist paradigm and used a 
modified grounded research approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 
1990; Whiteley 2000). Forty-five directors of public listed Australian companies and 
sixteen Australian funds management executives were interviewed. Directors 
interviewed were on more than one publicly listed company board. Their experiences 
have been gleaned from past and present board memberships and their responses 
drew on this overall experience, spreading their examples over time and 
geographical space. The research sought to develop a shared view of the world of 
corporate governance as experienced by these directors (McCabe 2002).  
Content analysis, an adaptation of Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss 1967) 
based on theoretical rules, was used to establish categories of meaning. Categories 
of meaning arose from the interview data and from financial press literature collected.  
Theoretical sensitivity was developed as a result of comparison of data, allowing for 
numerous iterations. Principal findings are based on the categories of meaning 
drawn from the interview data (McCabe 2002). 
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Applying the Grounded Research Approach 
The research makes use of the generative aspects of Grounded Theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967), applying both theoretical sampling and content analysis. The iterative 
process used permits meaning to be arrived at via discovery and emergence such 
that it is ‘provisional, capable of reforming and reshaping as interaction proceeds’ 
(Whiteley 2000 p. 5).  
Turner (1981) and Glaser (1978) argue that ‘orthodoxy of approach’ should not be 
imposed on those using grounded theory. Adherence to the guiding principles is, 
nevertheless, necessary. Whiteley (2000 pp. 6-7) argues that the process of 
institutionalisation in business settings has laid the basis for conceptualisation to a 
degree that contaminates the use of pure Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 
1967). However, there is still value in making use of aspects of Grounded Theory 
(Strauss, 1990; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Whiteley (2000) proposed a modified 
grounded research approach as appropriate. The concept of corporate governance 
has become institutionalised and this research adopts the position that the use of the 
grounded research approach proposed by Whiteley is warranted (McCabe 2002). 
Participating Directors 
The preferred model for board composition in Australian public listed companies is 
that of a majority of Non-Executive Directors (Bosch 1993). In this model it is also 
preferred that the Chairperson be an independent director, thus separating the roles 
of the CEO and the Chair. The shift to the appointment of independent non-executive 
directors was promoted as the norm in Australia (Hilmer 1993; AIMA 1997; Australian 
Stock Exchange 1998; Norburn, Boyd, Fox and Murth 2000) as a result of corporate 
excesses of the nineteen-eighties. Whilst in the United Kingdom the Cadbury Report 
(Cadbury 1992) also promoted a board composition that would include independent 
directors, the preference was for the role of CEO and Chairperson to be combined. 
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Demographics of the directors participating in this research (Table 1) are consistent 
with the preferred model for Australian BOCDs. It is worth noting that a number of the 
participants held positions on different boards in both executive and non-executive 
capacities. At the same time the interview data reveals that there are examples of 
other models to be found in the Australian context. 
Table I: Demographics of participating directors 
Academic 
Qualifications 
Board Positions No of Boards Age Distribution 
Awards             Directors Roles                      Directors Boards    Directors Ages         Directors 
None             ….  4 Executive only ……...  1    1 only …    1 < 35   ….    0 
Professional   ….  2 Non-exec only …….  24 2-4  ….     18 35-49  ….   4 
Undergraduate…13 Exec and Non-exec ..  5 > 4  ….     11 50-65  ….  16 
Masters/Hons …. 8    > 65    …. 10 
Doctorate       …. 3    
 
Whilst the exception rather than the rule, one participant went on record as belonging 
to a BOCD made up exclusively of executive directors.  
…/ our company for instance has been built with all executive directors - with no 
Non-Executive directors…/ 
Types of Directors 
A key point of discussion was the need to distinguish between Non-Executive 
directors (NEDS) who are considered to be independent and NEDs who are not 
independent. It can usually be expected that a board will include executive directors 
and non-executive directors (AIMA 1997; Bosch 1995; Hilmer 1993). The non-
executive directors (NEDs) can contain two distinct groups. There are those who are 
truly independent of management and those who are not independent of 
management because of past or current relationships.   
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…/ now let us be clear about what you mean…/ you have got to distinguish 
between independent directors and Non-Executive directors…/ some retired 
executives want to continue to be managing their power bases in the 
corporation…/  



























Figure 1 shows categories of directors that were identified by participating directors 
along with some key characteristics of each group. The Australian preference for a 
separation of CEO and Chair (AIMA 1997) does not exclude the likelihood that the 
roles can at times be combined (Figure 1). Where they are not combined, the 
purpose of the separation is to demonstrate independence for the role of the Chair.  
The chairperson should be an independent director or, if the chairperson 
is not an independent director, the independent directors should appoint 
one of their number to be lead director and to report to them on issues 
falling within the normal purview of a Non-Executive chairperson (AIMA 
1997,  p. 21). 
History has shown that the intention of the regulators in this regard can be frustrated 
if the notion of independence is compromised in any way. The restructuring of the 
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BHP board in 1998 saw the removal of both the CEO (Hextall 1998; Durie 1998) and 
the Chairman (Bolt and Kitney 1998; Flint and Hurst 1998) in an effort to provide a 
measure of independence to the two roles.  
NED and independent? 
Bosch (1993) describes the requirements for independence as not being a 
substantial shareholder, not being employed in any executive capacity by the 
company within the last three years, not retained as a professional advisor by the 
company, not a significant supplier to the company and having no significant 
contractual relationship with the company other than as a director. Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) describe these directors as ‘outsiders’.  
Company directors interviewed in the study were of the opinion that directors who are 
‘NEDs and independent’ need to demonstrate an independence of mind, 
independence of knowledge sources and independence of income. 
…/  exercise absolutely independent judgement …/ stand alone independent 
thinking …/ encourage them rather than discourage them from getting 
independent information …/ an independent staff, office, relationships …/  is not 
dependent on board fees for a substantial part of his income…/ not beholden to it 
because they are a major supplier to the company…/   
NED but not independent 
Non-Executives Directors who are not independent were described by Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) as ‘grey area’ directors. In an Australian study (Clifford and Evans, 
1997) it was found that 35% of the Non-Executive directors in publicly listed 
companies in the study were in this category. They are former employees, major 
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shareholders or directors holding some other form of contractual relationship with the 
organisation such as providing goods or services.  
…/ been on the board for something like twenty years in 1996 [and so] classified 
as not being independent …/ a director who is a partner in a law firm which is 
used by the company is not independent …/ a big shareholder has a vested 
interest in outcomes …/ they should be called Non-Executive directors as distinct 
from the independent Non-Executive director…/ 
Executive Director 
The Executive Director is either on the board in an executive capacity or in the 
capacity of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the combined role of CEO and 
Chairman. While executive directors form a traditional category of BOCD members 
some participating directors viewed having executives as members of the BOCD as 
problematic. 
…/ the senior executive team ought to be in the board meeting as observers …/ it 
is very difficult for executive directors to contribute as a director…/ 
 
Requirements of Independence 
Within the board, the role of the independent director has taken on a greater 
significance in the Australian BOCD since the nineteen-eighties. Participating 
directors talked about three dimensions that were important in identifying the 
independent director. Directors should be able to irrefutably demonstrate their 
independence; they should be responsible to shareholders; and they should be 
available to devote the time required of the role of an independent director.   
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Independence in the relationship with the organisation was an essential feature of 
demonstrating independence. In addition to Bosch’s (1993) requirement of the 
independent director as having no historical or monetary connection with the 
company, the question of relationship with the organisation also included the day to 
day working relationship with the company.  
…/ directors generally do not get themselves involved in the nitty-gritty of day to 
day management …/  
Participants considered that providing an independent view in the boardroom 
assisted directors in maintaining a balance of power within the boardroom with a view 
to sustaining board management relationships. Because this was important to the 
overall operation of the board, resulting in benefits to the organisation, it followed that 
having independent directors on the board was of importance.  
…/ providing first of all an independent view …/ stand alone independent thinking 
…/ there has got to be a good relationship between the board and 
management…/ understand well the role of the Non-Executive director compared 
 11
with management…/  do not try to back seat drive management but try to 
stimulate…/ 
Relationship with the organisation 
The balance required called for maintaining a workable relationship with 
management and respect for the independence of the director.  
…/ act as a check and a balance on the enthusiasms of management…/ capacity 
to say management is wrong, or the major shareholder is wrong…/ 
When Justice Rogers (1992) made the observation that within business 
conglomerates the opportunity for Non-Executive directors to exercise meaningful 
control over management was extremely slight he highlighted the extent to which 
management is seen as the embodiment of the corporation. As a social entity 
(Francis 1997) the corporate identity is able to reflect the characteristic features of 
the management team and its make-up. This view of the firm differs significantly from 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976 p. 311) ‘black box’ view described as ‘legal fiction’ 
serving as a nexus for contracting relationships. 
Grady (1999) describes the board role in a way that implies that a closer relationship 
can exist between management and the board than is usually demonstrated on 
Australian BOCDs. Among directors there were those who saw the traditional 
separation of board and management as necessary. One participant, holding the role 
of chairman on a board, held firmly to the idea that boards and management should 
remain separate.  
…/ I also have the responsibility to be the bridge between management and 
board because I am leading the board…/  
Another director held similar views. 
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…/ once they get interlinked into where management is it will become counter 
productive…/ 
These views are consistent with the traditional property model of corporate 
governance supported by agency theory (Francis 1997). Finklestein and Hambrick 
(1996) talk about the monitoring role of the board. Pease and McMillan (1993) talk 
about the dual roles of the board, describing them as strategic planner/pilot and that 
of supervisor/monitor. Participants also identified these two roles, 
…/ divides them into pilot boards and monitoring boards…/ The piloting, 
monitoring thing is I think, only just one way of looking at it…/ in the past I think 
that they were all pilot boards…/ the accrediting board could in fact be the piloting 
board…/ 
For others the monitoring role was seen to focus on the board’s role of ratifying and 
monitoring the implementation of strategy. Development of strategy was not included 
in any descriptions of the monitoring role. This suggests that directors saw the 
monitoring role as consistent with agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983), but not 
extending to the more dynamic model of best practice they promote in the interviews. 
…/ their job is to ensure that this Chief Executive that they put in and that they 
are monitoring against his strategies, is in fact achieving the increments in 
shareholder wealth that they set out to do, rather than get involved in a really 
hands on way with what he is doing on a constant basis…/ 
Directors warned that too close a relationship with management puts the 
independence of directors at risk. 
…/ directors have to associate with the company but they still have to maintain 
that air of independent and objective overview…/ 
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Grady (1999), on the other hand, maintains that exercised properly, the 
strengthening of this relationship can actually work to also strengthen and maintain 
the independence of directors. 
The activities of the board that participants saw as directed towards management 
included maintaining board/management relationships, reflecting on what is 
happening in the company and monitoring the delivery and implementation of 
strategy.  
…/ it is a collective thing. In board performance analysis it is very important to get 
management input…/ how does the board relate to management? That is an 
equally important question…/ but I think that it is a chairman's role and duty to 
make sure that the other members of the board do have similar contacts, for 
example, by plant visits, by meeting with managers, by having managers address 
the board, by meeting with customers, by meeting with suppliers…/ 
This suggests that directors see interaction between management and the board as 
enhancing their ability to function as a board. In reference to the board’s role one 
director commented on what was perceived to be a best practice relationship 
between board and management.  
…/ best practice companies I would see as proactive and interactive with 
management …/ 
In the discussions concerning the various activities of the board, in particular those 
that were perceived as related to performance of the organisation, it was clear that 
there was a reliance on a strong working relationship between the board and 
management. The relationship between board and management is clearly 
demonstrated when the board is called upon to make judgements about risk based 
on the information made available by management. When directors claim that ‘risk 
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taking is what generates value for shareholders’ there is clearly a reliance on 
management to facilitate this function of the board through the provision of relevant 
and sufficient information. It follows then that relationship with management was 
seen by most directors as crucial in the development of strategy. 
…/ you really want a board to be … interacting in an iterative kind of way in the 
development of the strategy …/ the board is responsible for the vision and 
strategy of the company. However, this is not done in a vacuum and the board 
works in an integrated fashion with the management to arrive at (a) the final 
strategy and (b) the manner in which the strategy is to be implemented …/  
Thus for the independent company director reflecting on what happens across the 
company, and understanding what happens in the delivery and implementation of 
strategy calls for extensive awareness of external environmental influences. By 
implication there is need to be connected to these things in the organisation. This is 
what Grady (1999) refers to as the board’s responsibility to contribute to creating 
history as opposed to restricting the board’s functions to reviewing history through 
the process of reviewing and assessing what has happened in the company to this 
point. Dunphy (2000) suggests there is increasing demand for corporations to work 
towards a future vision rather than be entrenched in precedent and past practices. 
Stacey (1996) claims it is also necessary to know what is happening and how these 
things are impacting on the operating environment and anticipating the ways that 
they need to be adjusted in response.  
Independence of income 
Associated with demonstrating independence in relationships with the organisation is 
the requirement that independent directors have an independent source of income. 
Whilst the discussion concerning remuneration of independent directors 
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acknowledged that there were many forms in which this can be done, there was a 
consensus that in the name of independence these directors should not be 
dependent for their income on any one particular board. 
…/ They are not beholden because that is the only source of income that they 
have …/ independent staff, office, relationships…/ 
Independence of mind 
Whilst independence in the relationship with the organisation was considered an 
essential, participating directors considered that ‘independence of mind’ was the 
most significant requirement.  
 …/ stand alone independent thinking …/ 
Although proponents for the inclusion of independent directors on boards have seen 
this as a way of opening up BOCDs to bring new perspectives to the board table, it 
has been claimed that most boards, having secured both executive and Non-
Executive membership, lack the diverse thinking that is required for challenging 
management’s thinking (Grady 1999, p.10).  In Grady’s view this is because most 
directors are men ‘cut from the same cloth’. Leighton, reporting on the structural 
characteristics of Canadian and U.S boards claims, 
It takes a bold and secure director or search firm to put forward the 
name of a woman, a labour sympathizer, socialist, environmentalist or 
other outspoken advocate to any board selection committee, and if 
someone is suggested from 'outside the box', that name usually 
disappears in the process … (Leighton 2000 p. 258). 
Appointing directors that are independent of the organisation does not in itself ensure 
independence of thought and professional judgement. The differentiating feature for 
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the independent director is that information is freely available to them and able to be 
supplemented by them from other independent sources of information (Nowak and 
McCabe, 2003).  
The collapse of the insurance company HIH, in Australia (Chenoweth and Hepworth 
2001; Honourable Justice Hely 2001) is viewed as an example of poor judgement 
endorsed as a result of inadequate information being provided to board members. In 
this instance the prevailing board culture resulted in an over reliance on the individual 
judgement of the CEO and strong ‘group think’ (Four Corners 2001). It was not 
sufficient that the board structure provided apparently ‘independent’ directors. 
Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998) propose that the Board of Company Directors 
(BOCD) become a repository of knowledge and experience that of necessity must 
match the strategic demands of the company. Pease and McMillan (1993) consider 
that by ensuring that there are both directors who are Non-Executive and 
independent and directors who are Non-Executive but not independent, it is possible 
to sustain a healthy climate of conflicting and diverse thinking on the board, so 
avoiding the perils of ‘group think’. Independence of mind is seen as an essential 
prerequisite if the intent of the regulatory requirement is to be met.  
Independence of information sources 
Participating directors also believed that they needed to have confidence that they 
could request access to internal information and management sources when what 
they had was deemed to be insufficient.  
…/ I cannot really make a rational objective decision or judgement about this 
unless I have got that level of input of information, or standard of information…/  
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Again, the HIH example (Four Corners 2001) provides evidence of what can 
potentially result when this confidence in the CEO’s willingness to provide access to 
critical information is missing.  
The inclusion of independent Non-Executive directors does not necessarily ensure 
that the objective of access to diverse areas of information is met. Nowak and 
McCabe (2003) report that directors perceive that the power over information is in the 
hands of management and that directors have to develop a range of information 
garnering strategies to access the information required to fulfill their role. The value 
of independence was seen to be lessened when the independent director was reliant 
largely on management for information required in performing as a member of the 
board. Providing a board structure with a majority of independent Non-Executive 
directors is not deemed sufficient to ensure the integrity of the board (Francis 1997).   
Boards are encouraged to recruit members from a wide range of professional 
backgrounds that are relevant to the industrial and marketing environment of the 
organisation (Pease and McMillan 1993). People with backgrounds within the 
industry and its competitive environments, or within associated fields, are in a 
position to gain their knowledge from sources independent of the internal 
management. They are also in a position to supplement the knowledge and expertise 
of management. In the words of one of the participating directors:  
…/ they bring to a company some experience which would benefit 
management…/ if the independent director does not have the capacity for getting 
information or knowledge about the company or the industry or the world, other 
than through management then its independence is mitigated …/ 
Traditionally, management was the principal provider of information to BOCDs. In the 
view of participants this remains, for many, the model for Non-Executives to access 
critical information. 
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…/ Non-executive directors receive information in a very formal channel…/ as a 
director you are absolutely at the mercy of the Chief Executive and the 
management and you rely on them enormously to give you the information that 
you need .../  
While the practice of appointing independent directors does not necessarily arise 
from the logic of agency theory (Nowak and McCabe 2003) the dependence of 
independent directors on management as the principal source of information does. 
Management are the agents appointed by the owners to operate the company. In this 
position, management is in control of the operational information pertaining to the 
day-to-day running of the organisation. Directors are dependent on management for 
this information. In this study directors discussed the problems associated with 
accessing information they needed.   
…/ Chief Executives want to, even the good ones … tend to want to control the 
flow of information to the board…/ if people putting up the information on the 
proposals have the power, it is difficult to get around that…/ 
Bosch (1995, p. 15) attributes the collapse of the State Bank of South Australia to a 
management team that manipulated ‘the provision of information to the board in 
order to procure the result which management sought.’  
Most participating directors believed that management would give them information if 
they asked for it but in many cases it would be a case of having to ask for specific 
information.  
…/ if they think that it is inadequate they can always ask for more information or 
they can ask to come in and have a talk or a proper briefing…/ 
Directors in this study made a strong case for independent directors having 
independent means of accessing information.  
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…/ encourage them rather than discourage them from getting 
independent information …/ it is a matter of keeping themselves 
informed …/ 
The recommendation that all directors have unrestricted access to company 
documents and that the company fund external sources of information (Governance 
1999) addresses these concerns and moves the current practice within Australian 
BOCDs towards the practices that prevail in the American approach to accessing 
information. Francis (1997) indicates that more and more Australian directors are 
turning to outside experts, credit rating agencies, risk analysis and business audit 
companies in their quest for information when assessing their own organisation.  
One participant talking about his lengthy experience with American boards indicated 
that: 
…/ anything that you wanted to do has to go through almost a separate process 
of due diligence to convince the independent directors that it was fair to the 
minority shareholders and that often included getting independent legal and 
independent accounting advice for the independent directors…/ 
Experiences among participants indicate that this level of independence is not yet a 
part of the Australian board culture.  
…/ (for) a Non-Executive director of an Australian company, it would be 
extraordinary if he went out and sought independent legal advice because he 
needed to protect himself in a transaction that the company was involved in…/ 
If management is the principal supplier of information, the extent of the BOCD’s 
dependence on management contributes to a highly predictive arrangement. 
Solutions tend to be those proposed by and sought by management. This has the 
capacity to restrict the potential for innovation and change. Complex adaptive 
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systems theory defines this situation as simple and linear (Stacey 1996). Simple 
linear lines of communication restrict discussion and produce highly predictive 
outcomes (Griffin, Shaw and Stacey 1998). If X is the case then Y is expected (Jones 
1995).  
The case where information is being accessed freely from within the organisation and 
also from external sources (Francis 1997) does not fit within the predictive model. A 
non-linear way of operating is complex and enables dynamic interaction to produce 
emergent solutions (Griffin, Shaw and Stacey 1998). This framework allows 
independent contributions with regard to deliberation and the making of judgements. 
In such an environment BOCD members are encouraged to bring innovative and 
challenging ideas to the board room. 
Responsibilities to shareholders 
Recognition of the responsibility to shareholders acknowledges shareholders as 
owners. It implies that there is a focus on shareholder value and accountability that is 
transparent. 
…/ have responsibility and accountability to the whole body of shareholders …/ 
acting on behalf of shareholders…/ a good board … thinks about performance 
and creating wealth for shareholders …/  
Shareholders are owners in a corporation by virtue of the monetary investment that 
they make in the company (Butterworth 1997). Directors saw the shareholders as the 
real owners of the company. 
…/ the real owners are the shareholders…/ 
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Directors observed that, simply in terms of numbers, individual small shareholders 
formed a significant group. However their position in the life of the organisation was 
not seen to be commensurate with the size of the group. 
…/ in most if not all public companies the individual shareholders in numbers of 
shareholders, far exceed the number of institutions. It may be that those 
individual shareholders will not have the comprehension of what is being 
presented to them that they should have…/ 
In spite of the large numbers of individual shareholders the implication is that, as a 
group, their influence is limited. Consultation with the individual shareholder does not 
figure as a significant dynamic in the development of corporate strategies designed 
to achieve shareholder value (Useem 1996).  
It is clear that, other than at the Annual General Meeting, only a major shareholder is 
in a position to wield significant influence. In Australia, the Australian Shareholders 
Association provides individual, small shareholders with the benefits of a concerted 
voice, when, as isolated voices, they could easily be overlooked or ignored. However 
it does not provide them with a voice or voting rights in the board room. In the logic of  
Agency theory the individual investor, while not having internal voice, does have exit 
voice and can quit their shares if not satisfied with company performance. The role of 
the BOCD in a public listed company involves enhancing investor confidence (Bosch 
1993; Hilmer 1993; Useem 1996). The board will only achieve this by producing 
positive performance results for the organisation. Concentrating on performance 
activities will normally satisfy the need to focus on shareholder interests. As directors 
commented, 
…/ you have got to focus on shareholder value…/ bottom line focus of 
shareholder value…/  
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Protecting Independence and ensuring availability 
Protecting the independence of directors was considered to be crucial. Directors saw 
the tendency for independent directors to remain on the board for an extended period 
of time as eroding an individual’s capacity for independence. Being ‘appointed for a 
limited time’ was considered an appropriate way of protecting independence of 
directors.   
…/ independent directors should not remain on the board of a particular company 
for too long…/ we have said ten years is ample…/ 
Directors observed that ensuring that directors were ‘able to allocate sufficient time 
for board duties’ was also an important part of protecting the independence of 
directors.  
…/ someone who has the time to put in …/ who will spend enough time to 
understand the company…/ 
The number of directorships held by an independent director tends to give credence 
to the fact that a particular person is of value to a BOCD. Developments within 
corporate governance legal frameworks have questioned this practice. Mattis (2000) 
observes that there is a trend for executives and directors to hold fewer directorships 
due to liability issues. Bringing an informed and independent view to BOCD 
deliberations requires the independent director to allocate the amount of time 
required for research and deliberation.  
Selecting independent directors 
Wallis (2000) and Pollak (2000) discuss the responsibility of the BOCD to appoint 
directors to the board as well as to select and appoint the CEO. Given the propensity 
for boards prior to the nineteen-nineties to subscribe to the ‘old boys club’ strategy for 
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succession planning, or at best an ad hoc basis (Hilmer 1993), it is understandable 
why directors gave importance to this. It is clear from the qualitative findings that the 
‘old boys’ club’ mentality was something boards wanted to avoid in their succession 
planning but it was not always clear this could be easily achieved.  
…/ business was done on the old boy network…/ there was a little bit of an old 
boys’ club around…/ one of the things that companies do not always do well, I 
think, is to be sure that they have got proper succession plans in order…/ 
There is evidence in the literature that general practice still does not demonstrate all 
that is aspired to in this regard. Leighton (2000) considers the role of the major 
shareholder in selection of board members and suggests that pragmatism drives the 
process. 
It is much easier and hassle-free to operate on an ad hoc process built 
on an old boys’ network, where the board has at most a kind of veto 
over candidates put forward by the chairman or major shareholder 
(Leighton 2000 p. 25).  
Both Leighton (2000) and Grady (1999) are of the opinion that, in spite of the 
changes with regard to board structures, the trend continues. Those chosen for 
directorships are more likely to be ‘cut from the same cloth’ or ‘people like us’.  
Directors also noted the obvious gender disparity in the composition of boards. They 
talked about the reasons underpinning the lack of significant numbers of women on 
BOCDs. Directors considered that experience in executive roles was the definitive 
factor preventing many women from being included on boards. 
…/ there is a lot happening that is causing younger women to gather that 
experience and they are coming into boards and are very effective and it is easy 
to recognise the fact that they have got that experience…/ there is some question 
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about how we address that subject because it would possibly be a good idea for 
us if we could find a way to put women in a position where they can gain that 
experience without us having to go through another twenty years of the 
development of women in business…/ 
Mattis (2000), in researching the appointment of women to corporate boards in 
America, examines the four principle findings of a report by an executive search firm 
(Daum 1999). Relatively few women have reached the level in the corporate ladder 
that provides a pool of potential directors (i.e. former or current CEO, CFO or 
Chairman), those who have reached this level are selective when choosing the board 
invitations they accept, the recent trend for executives to hold fewer directorships due 
to liability issues and serving on a corporate board can be a major distraction from 
one's own career. Consequently, qualified women were considered more likely than 
men to decline invitations to join boards.  
Figure 3:    In search of a director. 
 




Qualities you want 
 





Directors talked about what they considered to be the essential qualities one looks 
for when selecting a director (Figure 3). While directors claim that they would want to 
see these qualities in all directors, clearly they are the criteria applied in the selection 














Table II: Criteria for organisational leadership 
          Selection Criteria                 Comparative skills; company directors’ perceptions 
          Charan’s CEO                                           of skills required by directors 
 Intellectual capacity for 
dealing with complexity 
 
Conceptual skills  
 …/helping the company through the complexities and 
challenges…/ensuring the right issues are on management 
agenda…/good conceptual skills…/ 
Business  instincts ‘Business nous’  
…/if they have got commercial nous they have got a whole lot of other 
skills…/ I mean commercial judgment…/ a really best practice board if 
you have people with commercial nous…/ 
Superb at selecting 




Have the right people 
…/you have got to have good people, good succession…/Creating 
synergy 
…/get everything in harmony and synergy…/disharmonies…there is a 
whole lot of wasted activity…/ 
 




Social and communication skills. 
…/if people around the table have got a reasonable sense of humour 
you can defuse it…/perception and the ability to communicate that 
Edge in Execution, delivers 
measurable results. 
Desirability for directors to take decisions  to take acceptable risk 
…/create shareholder wealth by taking risks…/have people who are 
willing to take on an acceptable degree of risk…/ 
Builds positive working 
relationship with the board 
Totally honest in keeping 
the board informed on 
positives and negatives  
Integrity as a personal leadership trait. 
…/you have got to have honesty and integrity…/ proper ethics…/ weigh 
up information and ethical considerations…/ 
Succession planning as 
organisational 
responsibility 
Succession planning involving whole organisation 
…/so that you have got successional alternatives in place…/ on the 
performance side…need to ensure that there are succession plans in 
place for management. 
 
 
Derived from: (Charan 1998, pp.  208-209). 
 
Charan (1998) developed a set of criteria for use in the selection process for the 
CEO, and proposed that using the same set of criteria throughout the 
organisation would assist in embedding the leadership qualities sought by the 
organisation in its corporate genetic code. It is useful to consider the qualities 
proposed by the participating directors alongside comparative criteria from 
Charan in Table II. It is apparent that there is considerable consistency between 
the qualities directors sought in fellow directors and selected criteria from 
Charan’s list for the selection of the CEO.  
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Conclusion 
The jury is still out as to whether or not independence is linked to improved 
performance (Heracleous 2001; Clifford and Evans 1997; Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991).  Directors who were interviewed claimed that the 
independent director had a role on the board - and that there was potential for 
this role to be a significant one. At the same time they did not make a claim 
for independence being a significant influence on sustainable performance. 
Some directors considered there were disadvantages associated with the 
practice of an independent chairman particularly in attaining a competitive 
edge in the market place. In spite of these differences of opinion the findings 
show that participating directors supported the notion of independence among 
directors. They provided information on how that should best be 
demonstrated, the qualities that enable independence in a director and the 
support systems to facilitate that independence. 
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